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Historic Rights in the South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective 
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Historic rights’ has been a complicated issue in the law of the sea both conceptually 
and practically. China’s sovereign and maritime claims in the South China Sea, which 
are marked through the ‘U-shaped line’ or ‘dotted-line’ or ‘nine-dash line,’ touch upon 
the historic rights and have been regarded as one of the most controversial issues 
among East Asian maritime disputes so far. Recent years, the South China Sea 
Arbitration case between the Philippines and China raised important issues regarding 
the contemporary relevance and validity of historic claims, and the relationship 
between the Law of the Sea Convention (hereinafter the ‘LOS Convention’) and 
historic rights. This article would not examine a comprehensive theory of historic 
rights, rather, it will just give case by case studies and will compare certain 
international practice with China’s claims from the perspective of literal 
interpretation, and then examine the possible content and nature of historic-related 
claims in the South China Sea by China based on its existing positions. 
In the first part, it will give a relevant background of China’s historic-related 
claims and relevant considerations of these claims on the international law; in the 
second part, it will identify and discuss in depth the most recent development of 
China’s historic rights claims and practice, from which the geographic scope and 
nature of those rights may be presumed; in the third part, it will examine the potential 
legal consequences of these claims for the dispute settlement procedures under the 
LOS Convention; and finally, a conclusion will be given. 
 
I. EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S CLAIMS TO THE HISTORIC-RELATED 
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE CONDIDERATIONS OF 
THESE CLAIMS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
So far, China has not yet explicitly declared the nature, content or geographic scope of 
historic rights it claims in the South China Sea region. In addition, with a number of 





































































is even more complicated when one tries to examine China’s claim on the historic 
rights. Yet it is necessary to look through China’s practice relating to historical context 
in the past decades. 
1. Historic Bays and Historic Waters 
China first expressed its view on historic waters in 1957, when it supported the 
Soviet Union claim to Peter the Great Bay.1 In 1958, China issued the Declaration of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea 
(hereinafter the “1958 Declaration of Territorial Sea”), in which the Bohai Bay was 
enclosed within the baseline and thus was deemed as Chinese inland waters.2 
The rules related to historic bays can be seen as well-established customary 
international law. In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. United 
States), Dr. Luis M. Drago put forward the concept of historic bays in the Dissent that: 
“[I]t may be safely asserted that a certain class of bays, which might be properly 
called the historical bays such as Chesapeake Bay and Delaware Bay in North 
America and the great estuary of the River Plate in South America, form a class 
distinct and apart and undoubtedly belong to the littoral country, whatever be their 
depth of penetration and the width of their mouths, when such country has asserted its 
sovereignty over them, and particular circumstances such as geographical 
configuration, immemorial usage and above all, the requirements of self-defense, 
justify such a pretension.”3 
Professor James L. Brierly also pointed out in the 1940’s that “[t]here are certain 
bays, sometimes called ‘historic bays,’ much larger than this (refers to the distance 
between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds 24 
nautical miles, noted by the author), which are certainly inland waters.”4 
Thus in 1959, an official pamphlet was published in China in order to explain 
                                                             
1 Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” 32 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2001), p. 156. 
2 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea, Sept. 4, 1958, para. 
2. 
3 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. United States), in the Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards (Volume XI), p. 206. 
4 Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International 




































































China’s 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, this pamphlet gave a further detailed 
explanation of China’s own historic claims. It says that “[a]lthough the natural 
entrance of some bays or gulfs exceeds 24 nautical miles, if the bays or gulfs are 
important to the national defense and economy of the coastal states and for a long 
period the coastal states have repeatedly exercised jurisdiction over the bays or gulfs, 
they may be regarded as historical bays or gulfs. Regardless of whether or not the 
mouths of these bays or gulfs exceed 24 nautical miles, they may also be considered 
as internal bays or gulfs of the coastal states.”5 Obviously, this position was 
consistent with the international practice at that time. 
Besides, China declared in the 1958 Declaration of Territorial Sea that the 
‘Qiongzhou Straits’ was China’s inland waters based on historical considerations. The 
Qiongzhou Strait is located in the South China Sea area. In China’s view, the 
Qiongzhou Strait has an extremely important meaning for China’s economy and 
national defense: 
“Historically, it has always been subject to our sovereign jurisdiction and has 
constituted an inalienable, composite part of our country. Since liberation our country 
has always administered it as an internal strait. The present Declaration on the 
Territorial Sea issued by our government is merely to reaffirm once more a historical 
fact.”6 
This position should also be consistent with the international practice. In the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), the ICJ defined the 
‘historic waters’ as those “are usually meant waters which are treated as internal 
waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an 
historic title.”7 Thus the ICJ found and concluded that: 
“Norway can justify the claim that these waters are territorial or internal on the 
ground that she has exercised the necessary jurisdiction over them for a long period 
without opposition from other States, a kind of possessio longi temporis, with the 
                                                             
5 Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” 32 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2001), p. 156. 
6 Ibid, p.157. 




































































result that her jurisdiction over these waters must now be recognized although it 
constitutes a derogation from the rules in force. Norwegian sovereignty over these 
waters would constitute an exception, historic titles justifying situations which would 
otherwise be in conflict with international law.”8 
During that period, the organs of the United Nations also studied the concepts of 
historic waters and historic bays. The International Law Commission (ILC) discussed 
the concept of historic waters in the 1950s, and in 1962 the UN Secretariat, upon the 
request of the ILC, produced a study on the juridical regime of historic waters, 
including historic bays. The study examined the elements of title to historic waters, 
the issue of the burden of proof, the legal status of waters regarded as historic waters, 
and the settlement of disputes.9 The regimes of historic bays and historic waters, 
therefore, should be regarded as well-established rules of customary international law 
before the UNCLOS III. 
2. Historic Rights 
The UNCLOS III, however, marked a turning point for the application of 
historic-related rights. During the UNCLOS III, ‘historic waters’ was listed as a sub-
item under Item 2 ‘territorial sea’, which was allocated to the Second Committee. In 
relevant debate, several formal proposals were made by countries including the 
Philippines and Indonesia. But unfortunately, no further discussion of historic waters 
took place in the formal meetings of the Second Committee.10 Besides, UNCLOS III 
did not discuss the issue of ‘historic rights.’ Thus China did not express its position on 
these terms in public during the UNCLOS III. 
In anticipation of the ratification of the LOS Convention, China promulgated its 
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (hereinafter the “1992 Law on 
the Territorial Sea”) on February 25, 1992. The 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea does 
not mention any ‘historic rights.’ 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 
9 Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” 32 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2001), p. 151. 
10 Shabtai Rosenne, “Historic Waters in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, in T.D. Gill 
and W.P. Heere, eds., Reflections on Principles and Practice of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 




































































However, on June 26, 1998, China promulgated its Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (hereinafter the “1998 Law on EEZ and 
Continental Shelf”), in which the Article 14 has been seen as the most widely-known 
provision for China to claim historic rights. In this Article, China declared that: 
“The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People's 
Republic of China.”11 
Although this provision remains unclear that where can China enjoy its historic 
rights and what’s the nature of such rights, we may presume that the historic rights 
claimed by China are different from the historic bays and historic waters claimed in 
the 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, and are not situated within the scope of 
territorial sea. Rather, the historic rights may be claimed not limited by the scope of 
EEZ or continental shelf determined by the related rules of 1998 Law on EEZ and 
Continental Shelf. 
In 2009, China presented a Note Verbale to the UN to protest other coastal 
States’ joint submissions to the CLCS. In this Note Verbale, China attached the U-
shaped line map and pointed out that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, enjoys sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” But 
China did not mention the term of historic rights in this Note Verbale, thus we cannot 
assume those mentioned rights refer to historic rights. It is noteworthy that the second 
paragraph in this Note Verbale declares that “[t]he above position is consistently held 
by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by the international community.” 
Given that the U-shaped line map is attached in the Note Verbale, it seems that the 
‘widely known’ position refers to the U-shaped line claim. 
The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China raised 
important issues regarding the contemporary relevance and validity of historic claims, 
and the relationship between the LOS Convention and historic rights. These issues 
                                                             
11 Article 14, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (Adopted at the third session of the Standing 





































































were triggered by the Philippine Submissions 1 and 2 in its Memorial, which reads: 
“1. China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the 
Philippines, may not extend beyond those permitted by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
2. China's claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to ‘historic rights,’ 
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-
called ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the 
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China's maritime 
entitlements under UNCLOS.”12 
The Arbitral Tribunal issued its final award on July 12, 2016. To respond the 
award, China issued the Statement on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 
Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (hereinafter the “2016 Statement”) on the 
same day. In this Statement, China clearly affirmed that it has enjoyed historic rights 
in the South China Sea: 
“China has territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South 
China Sea, including, inter alia: 
i. China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of Dongsha Qundao, 
Xisha Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao and Nansha Qundao; 
ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on 
Nanhai Zhudao; 
iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai 
Zhudao; 
iv. China has historic rights in the South China Sea.”13 
To compare the 2016 Statement with the 2009 Note Verbales, it is easily to be 
found that the two are largely consistent. The “sovereignty over the islands in the 
South China Sea and the adjacent waters” mentioned in the 2009 Note Verbale, refers 
                                                             
12 The Philippines' Memorial - Volume I, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The 
People's Republic of China), p. 271. Available online: https://files.pca-
cpa.org/pcadocs/Memorial%20of%20the%20Philippines%20Volume%20I.pdf 
13 Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 




































































to the statement points i and ii; the “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant 
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” refers to the statement points iii and 
iv. 
In conclusion, the above legal documents -- the Article 14 of the 1998 Law on 
EEZ and Continental Shelf, the 2009 Note Verbale with the U-shaped line map, and 
the 2016 Statement – outlined China’s claim on ‘historic rights’ in the South China 
Sea. Further to identify the concrete rights China claimed in the South China Sea, the 
U-shaped line cannot be ignored. 
 
II. THE U-SHAPED LINE AND CHINA’S EVOLVING POSITIONS ON THE 
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND CONTENT OF HISTORIC RIGHTS IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. The Nature and Content of Historic Rights China Enjoys within the U-
shaped Line 
The Chinese term for the ‘U-shaped line’ might best be translated as ‘traditional sea 
boundary line,’ which also refers to historic considerations. The U-shaped line 
originally came into being in 1914 and later gradually expanded in a southerly 
direction. It was officially confirmed in 1947 after World War II. Since then the line 
has remained unchanged on all the Chinese maps published either in the mainland or 
in Taiwan. For a long time, China has kept silent and offered no express statement for 
this line. 
It is noteworthy that in the 2016 Statement, the term ‘U-shaped line’ is only 
mentioned once at the beginning of the Statement: 
“To strengthen the administration over Nanhai Zhudao, the Chinese government 
in 1947 reviewed and updated the geographical names of Nanhai Zhudao, compiled 
Nan Hai Zhu Dao Di Li Zhi Lüe (A Brief Account of the Geography of the South 
China Sea Islands), and drew Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (Location Map of the 
South China Sea Islands) on which the dotted line is marked. This map was officially 





































































Thus some scholars may suppose that the U-shaped line claim has been dropped 
or de-emphasized by the Chinese government, because “the Chinese leadership may 
have realized that the Nine Dash Line has become too much of a diplomatic liability. 
The Nine-Dash Line is completely sui generis and no other state has made a historic 
maritime claim anything like it. For this reason, the Nine-Dash Line makes China an 
easy target for foreign criticism in a way that straight baselines around island groups 
probably will not.”15 
However, according to China’s practice, this is not the case. While the 
geographical scope of the lines has been almost unchanged over the years, the content 
of the rights embraced by them may have evolved, with Chinese practice being 
informed by developments in the law of the sea, including its own ratification of the 
LOS Convention.16 
Presently, the authoritative interpretation on the implications of the U-shaped 
line, from Chinese perspective, may include three factors: 
“The reasonable proposition is that the nine-dash line, after sixty years of 
evolution, has become 1) synonymous with a claim of sovereignty over the island 
groups that always belonged to China; 2) an additional Chinese claim of historical 
rights of fishing, navigation, and other marine activities (including the exploration and 
exploitation of resources, mineral or otherwise) on the islands and in the adjacent 
waters; 3) lines may also have a residual function as potential maritime delimitation 
boundaries.”17 
The Chinese government 2016 Statement has obviously concretised the rights 
which may be included in the U-shaped line claim, rather than de-emphasized this 
line. 
                                                             
14 Ibid, para. 1. 
15 Julian Ku and Chris Mirasola, “The South China Sea and China's ‘Four Sha’ Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad 
Argument,” Lawfare, available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/south-china-sea-and-chinas-four-sha-claim-new-
legal-theory-same-bad-argument 
16 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,” 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 107, Issue 1, p. 118. 




































































Another question arises in the context of the nature of historic rights in the South 
China Sea is the relations between these rights and those under the LOS Convention. 
There are no provisions in the LOS Convention which explicitly refer to historic 
rights. The reason why the Convention is silent on this issue seems that “there was no 
discussion on the general question of historic rights during UNCLOS III.”18 Instead, 
there are references to ‘historic bays’ and ‘historic title’ in Article 10(6), Article 15, 
and Article 298(1)(a). In general international law, ‘historic rights,’ ‘historic waters,’ 
and ‘historic titles’ are closely related terms.19 As indicated by international practice, 
rules of historic rights have been evolving constantly and have not given rise to a 
uniform regime. The ICJ points out that “[general international law] does not provide 
for a single ‘régime’ for ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic bays’, but only for a particular 
régime for each of the concrete, recognized cases of ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic 
bays’”.20 
In China’s view, the above issues, as well as those mentioned in the LOS 
Convention without detailed regulations, are “matters not regulated by this 
Convention”, and shall continue to be governed by general international law, pursuant 
to the Preamble of the Convention.21 This position is well supported by the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ. As found by the ICJ, “[n]or does the draft convention of the 
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea contain any detailed provisions on the 
‘régime’ of historic waters: there is neither a definition of the concept nor an 
elaboration of the judicial régime of ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic bays’. There are, 
however, references to ‘historic bays’ or ‘historic titles’ or historic reasons in a way 
amounting to a reservation to the rules set forth therein. It seems clear that the matter 
continues to be governed by general international law …”, “the notion of historic 
rights or waters … are governed by distinct legal regimes in customary international 
law”, and “[h]istoric titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always 
                                                             
18 Ma Xinmin, “Merits Award Relating to Historic Rights in the South China Sea Arbitration: An Appraisal”, Asian 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, Issue 1 (January 2018), pp. 12-23. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982, I.C.J. Reports, p. 18, para. 100. 
21 Ma Xinmin, “Merits Award Relating to Historic Rights in the South China Sea Arbitration: An Appraisal”, Asian 




































































been by long usage”.22 
During UNCLOS III, it was recognized by some states that the establishment of 
coastal states’ exclusive rights in the EEZ and continental shelf is bound to conflict 
with historic rights of other states.23 During the preliminary discussions, it was 
proposed by the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Mexico that the potential 
conflict should be addressed by regional regimes and bilateral treaties.24 The 
relationship between exclusive rights in the EEZ and continental shelf and historic 
rights was not discussed in depth and no agreement was reached. With respect to the 
continental shelf, although the ICJ held in the Tunisia/Libya case that the regime of 
the continental shelf is based on the existence of rights “ipso facto and ab initio”,25 it 
did not say historic rights cannot play a role in the delimitation of the continental 
shelf.26 One of the judges explicitly argued that a legal concept such as the the 
continental shelf “cannot by itself have the effect of abolishing or denying acquired or 
existing rights”.27 As the rules has been well established in general international law, 
‘historic rights’ were not superseded by the regimes of the EEZ and continental shelf. 
2. The Geographical Scope where China Enjoys the Historic Rights within 
the U-shaped Line 
With the ratification of the LOS Convention, the content of the rights enjoyed by 
China within the U-shaped line may have evolved. And consequently, the 
geographical scope where China enjoys the historic rights may also have changed. 
As mentioned above, China does not claim historic rights in its territorial seas. 
Although the territorial sea exists ipso facto and ab initio, and the lack of publicity 
and non-deposition of charts or lists of geographical coordinates do not make any 
difference in this matter,28 the geographic scope of territorial sea both in Xisha 
                                                             
22 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982, I.C.J. Reports, p. 18, para. 100. 
23 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.2, pp. 40-41, paras. 12-22. 
24 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/ CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, p. 70, para. 41; The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/ CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, p. 99, para. 29; The Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/ CONF.19/C.1/SR.24, p. 113, para. 7. 
25 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982, I.C.J. Reports, p. 18, para. 100. 
26 Sophia Kopela, “Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea 
Arbitration,” 48 Ocean Development and International Law (2017), p. 10. 
27 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982, I.C.J. Reports, Separate Opinion by Judge 
Jimenez de Arechaga, para. 82. 




































































(Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) remains an issue in the sense that whether or not the 
use of straight baselines to enclose dependent archipelagos is authorized by the 
international law, and the legitimacy of claiming territorial sea in the Spratly in its 
entirety. 
In May 1996, China designated straight baselines for the Xisha Islands, in their 
entirety, by joining several islands and reefs. The issue that whether or not the use of 
straight baselines to enclose dependent archipelagos is authorized by the international 
law is also mentioned in the award of the South China Sea Arbitration case. The 
Tribunal concluded that they did not think that could be done consistent with the LOS 
Convention or customary international law, but did not explain its rationale in detail.29  
The LOS Convention confers State Parties with the right to establish their 
baselines either through the “normal baseline” prescribed by Article 5, or through the 
“straight baseline” provided by Article 7 of the Convention.30 According to these 
provisions, Article 3 of the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea prescribes that “[t]he 
method of straight baselines composed of all the straight lines joining the adjacent 
base points shall be employed in drawing the baselines of the territorial sea of the 
People’s Republic of China.”31 
The Tribunal, however, believes that: “Article 7 provides for the application of 
straight baselines only ‘[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut 
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.’ These 
conditions do not include the situation of an offshore archipelago.”32 
The problem is that Article 46 defines an “archipelagic State” as “a State 
constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands” and 
thus, an Article 46 archipelagic State is distinguished from archipelagos that are part 
of a continental State. According to the travaux préparatoires and commentaries on 
                                                             
Deregulation or Re-balance,” 9 J. E. Asia & Int’l L. (2016) p.178. 
29 Award, PCA Case No. 2013-19, paras. 575-576, available online: 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086 
30 See: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, available online: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
31 See: Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, available online: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=670 




































































Article 46, it turned out that a number of States with dependent archipelagos, such as 
Ecuador with the Galapagos, sought to have them included. Competing versions 
appears in the texts that were considered during the 1974 and 1975 sessions of the 
Third Conference. But that proposal did not achieve consensus, and was dropped in 
the version considered at the fourth session in 1976, the RSNT, and did not reappear 
subsequently. 
Therefore, the fact that neither Article 5 on the normal baseline nor Article 7 on 
straight baselines explicitly preclude their use to enclose dependent archipelagos, 
makes it is possible that the last preambular paragraph of the LOS Convention applies. 
That paragraph states that “matters not regulated by the [LOS] Convention continue to 
be regulated by the rules and principles of general international law.”33 
It is necessary to examine the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case carefully and 
identify the factors which regarded by the ICJ as to be fundamental for justifying the 
establishment of straight baseline. In this case, the ICJ identified “certain basic 
considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea”: 
“Another fundamental consideration, of particular importance in this case, is the 
more or less close relationship existing between certain sea areas and the land 
formations which divide or surround them… 
Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of which 
extends beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain economic interest peculiar 
to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long 
usage.”34 
Obviously, the considerations on the adoption of straight baseline include not 
only the purely geographical factors, but also the social historical factors as well as 
the economic factors. This is the case for the reason why China established straight 
baseline to enclose the Xisha Islands.35 
                                                             
33 See: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, available online: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
34 Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 133, available online: http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/5/005-19511218-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 




































































Furthermore, there are more than 10 dependent archipelagos worldwide that have 
been enclosed with straight baselines: the Faroes (Denmark), Svalbard (Norway), the 
Canary Islands (Spain), the Azores (Portugal), Kerguelen Islands (France), Galapagos 
(Ecuador), the Bijagos Archipelago (Guinea-Bissau), the Arctic archipelago (Canada), 
Co Co and Preparis Islands (Myanmar), etc. 
Even though this state practice over the decades cannot be deemed as a rule of 
customary international law since there are a few oppositions which prevented the 
development of a uniform and widely accepted practice, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that the use of straight baselines to enclose dependent archipelagos is 
contrary to the LOS Convention or customary international law. 
The situation in Nansha is more complicated. There are sharp differences on 
legal status of certain maritime features, and consequently, on maritime entitlement 
for each feature as well as the Nansha Islands as a whole. 
China has long been reiterated the position that it enjoys the sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over the Nansha Islands in its entirety, 
rather than the single island or reef or low tide elevation. The 1958 Declaration of 
Territorial Sea indicated that “[t]he breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s 
Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all 
territories of the People’s Republic of China including the Chinese mainland and its 
coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the 
Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all 
other islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its 
coastal islands by the high seas.”36 
In Note Verbale No. CML/8/2011 of 14 April 2011 addressed to Secretary-
General of the UN, the Permanent Mission of China to the UN stated that “under the 
relevant provisions of the 1982 [LOS Convention], as well as the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic 
                                                             
36 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea, September 4, 1958, 




































































of China (1998), China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, [EEZ] and 
Continental Shelf.”37 
On July 12, 2016, the Chinese government reiterated that “China has territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, including, inter 
alia: …ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on 
Nanhai Zhudao; iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based 
on Nanhai Zhudao….”38 
Today however, it is not easy for China to draw such straight baselines for the 
Nansha Islands, as China and the ASEAN States have committed to each other under 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea  (DOC) which 
requires parties to “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes.” Technically, it is also not very easy for China 
to find appropriate islands and reefs on the outskirts of the Nansha Islands in order to 
join with straight lines enclosing all features of the Nansha Islands. It seems that 
China will not establish the baseline for Nansha Islands in the foreseeable future. 
Considering the above situation, the geographic scope for China to claim historic 
rights in the South China Sea still remains uncertainty in the near future. 
 
III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA’S CLAIMS FOR THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES UNDER THE LOS CONVENTION 
First, China believes that any dispute involving historic rights should be excluded 
from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the LOS Convention. This 
argument is based on the fact that historic rights originated from customary 
international law rather than the LOS Convention. 
The optional exceptions allowed by Article 298 include “disputes involving 
historic bays or titles,” which reads: 
                                                             
37 Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (2014/12/7), para. 21, available online: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml 
38 Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 





































































“1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time 
thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, 
declare in writing that it does not accept anyone or more of the procedures provided 
for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes: 
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 
83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles...”39 
The South China Sea Arbitration touches upon this exception by Philippines’ 
second Submission. In the Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic 
of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by 
the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter the “2014 Position Paper”), China did not 
argue an exception based on its historic rights. 
However, China appears to take the view that Article 298 should apply to 
discussions of “historic rights”, as evidenced in a short note posted on the website of 
the Chinese Mission to the European Union. This note says: 
“The negotiating history and official languages of the UNCLOS, as well as the 
wording of its Article 298 show that ‘historic titles’ under Article 298 do not refer to 
sovereignty only. Consequently, the dispute involving China’s historic rights is 
covered by Article 298, and should be excluded from compulsory arbitration.”40 
But the Tribunal rejected China’s position. It differentiated the terms “historic 
rights”, “historic waters,” “historic bays,” and “historic titles.” And concluded that 
“China has invoked its ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea, rather than ‘historic 
title’, as China had not at any point claimed ‘sovereignty over the entirety of the 
South China Sea.’ ” Based on this, the tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to 
consider the Philippines’ first and second Submissions. However, this differentiation 
is meaningless in this case. The Tribunal ignored a critical issue that the relationship 
between “disputes involving historic bays or titles” and the “interpretation or 
application of the Convention.” Although Article 298(1)(a)(i) does not qualify 
                                                             
39 Article 298 Optional exceptions to applicability of Section 2 
40 A Preliminary Report of the Facts Related to the Issue of Historic Rights Involved in the South China Sea 




































































“disputes involving historic bays or titles” by reference to the “interpretation or 
application of the Convention,” Articles 286 to 288 have implied this qualification. 
Thus, all disputes outside the scope of “interpretation or application of the 
Convention,” including those involving historic rights, are excluded from the 
compulsory procedures. 
Even the Tribunal accepted that “China’s assertions indicate a claim to rights 
arising independently of the Convention.”41 The reason why Article 298 specifically 
mentions “historic bays” and “historic titles,” seems that these are the terms used 
elsewhere in the Convention (such as Article 10(6) which refers to “historic bays” and 
Article 15 refers to “historic title”). 
Thus, disputes involving “historic rights” should be regulated by customary 
international law rather than the Convention. 
Second, China’s claims to historic rights obviously refers to maritime 
delimitation, which is excluded from compulsory dispute settlement procedures by 
Article 298(1)(a)(i). 
On July 13, 2016, China issued a white paper called China Adheres to the 
Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and 
the Philippines in the South China Sea, under the section of “maritime delimitation in 
the South China Sea”, paragraph 127 pointed out that: 
“China's positions on maritime delimitation in the South China Sea are further 
elaborated in the 1998 EEZ and Continental Shelf Law. This Law provides that, ‘[t]he 
People's Republic of China shall determine the delimitation of its exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf in respect of the overlapping claims by agreement with the 
states with opposite or adjacent coasts, in accordance with the principle of equitability 
and on the basis of international law’, and that, ‘[t]he provisions in this law shall not 
affect the historical rights that the People's Republic of China has been enjoying ever 
since the days of the past’.”42 
                                                             
41 Award, SCS Arbitration case, para.207 
42 China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the 





































































Thus in China’s view, its claim to historic rights should be also understood 
within the context of maritime delimitation. This view is well supported by 
international judicial practice. All cases involving historic title or historic rights were 
invoked by litigants within the framework of maritime delimitation, and courts and 
tribunals have examined their validity and relevance to the maritime boundary in this 
respect. 
Article 298(1)(a)(i) applies to “disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations”. It’s clear 
that matters “concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 74 and 83” as 
well as matters “relating to sea boundary delimitations” potentially have a broad 
meaning. This view can be supported by many judicial cases. 
In the M/V “Louisa” Case, the ITLOS pointed out that “[t]he use of the term 
'concerning' in the declaration indicates that the declaration does not extend only to 
articles which expressly contain the word 'arrest' or 'detention' but to any provision of 
the Convention having a bearing on the arrest or detention of vessels.”43 
In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ pointed out that “[t]he 
question for decision in whether the present dispute is one 'relating to the territorial 
status of Greece', not whether the rights in dispute are legally to be considered as 
'territorial' rights; and a dispute regarding entitlement to and delimitation of areas of 
continental shelf tends by its very nature to be one relating to territorial status.”44 
In the recent case on Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste and the Commonwealth of Australia, the Conciliation Commission pointed out 
that “[i]t is apparent from an examination of these articles of the Convention [i.e., 
Articles 15, 74 and 83] that they address not only the actual delimitation of the sea 
boundary between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, but also the question … 
that the Parties are called on to apply pending delimitation.”45 
                                                             
43 M/V “Louisa” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2013, p.31, 
para. 83. 
44 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment of 19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 
36, para. 86. 
45 Decision on Australia’s Objections to Competence, Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor-






































































China’s historic rights in the South China Sea have been in existence since long ago. 
The Chinese people have cherished relevant areas of the South China Sea as their 
home where they live and work, and firmly believe that the islands and reefs and 
relevant sea areas are within China’s domain. The Chinese government in successive 
periods have also exercised jurisdiction over the maritime features and relevant areas 
continuously, peacefully and effectively. Although the LOS Convention is silent on the 
relationship between historic rights and the regimes of EEZ and continental shelf, the 
Convention exhibits is respect for historic rights in Articles 10, 15, 51, and 298. Since 
the 1950s, China’s positions and practice regarding the historic-related rights should 
be well consistent with the international practice. Given the complicated situations of 
the sovereign and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, it is still not clear that 
where and what concrete rights China would claim within the U-shaped line. 
Nevertheless, any dispute involving historic rights should be excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the LOS Convention. 
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